Section(B)
Who Will Take Advantage of Human Cloning?
Last week's news that scientists had cloned a sheep sent academics and the public into a panic at the prospect that humans might be next. That's an understandable reaction. Cloning is a radical challenge to the most fundamental laws of biology, so it's reasonable to be concerned that it might be a preface to activities that will threaten human society and dignity.
Yet much of the moral opposition seems also to grow out of an automatic, unthinking disgust. This refusal to consider the issue logically makes it hard for even trained scientists and other experts to see the matter clearly. While human cloning might not offer great benefits to humanity, no one has yet made a convincing case that it would do any real harm, either.
Conservative spiritual leaders have claimed that cloning a human constitutes a gross attack on human dignity. That would surely be true if a cloned individual were treated as a lesser being, with fewer rights or lower status. But why suppose that the laws that protect our rights and dignity would not be applicable to cloned persons? A leading lawyer has suggested that cloning would violate the "right to a unique genetic identity".
Where did he come up with such a right? It makes perfect sense to say that adult persons have a right not to be cloned without their voluntary, informed consent. But if such consent were given, whose "right" to genetic identity would be violated? Many of the vivid warnings of science-fiction concerning the prospect of human cloning turn out,
upon reflection, to be wildly improbable.
There's the fear, for instance, that parents might clone a child for the sake of having "surplus parts" in case the original child needs an organ transplant. But parents
of identical twins don't view one child as an organ farm for the other. Why should cloned children's parents be any different?
Another disturbing thought is that cloning will lead to efforts to breed individuals with genetic qualities perceived as desirable (math geniuses, soccer players, etc.). Such ideas are offensive, not only because of an unthinking disgust, but also because of the horrors carried out by the Nazis in the name of improving their race. But there's a vast difference between the breeding programs as practiced by some groups (where the urge to breed certain types of people leads to efforts to destroy other types) and the much more harmless forms already practiced in democratic societies (where, say, lawyers freely choose to have sexual relations with other lawyers).
Banks stocked with the frozen sperm of geniuses already exist, but they haven't created a master race because few women are queuing up to get pregnant this way. Why should we think it would be different if human cloning becomes available? So who will likely take advantage of cloning? Perhaps a couple whose child is dying. This might seem psychologically suspect.
But a cloned child born to such suspect parents stands no greater or lesser chance of being loved, or rejected, than a child created the normal way. Infertile couples are also likely to seek out cloning. That such couples have other options (artificially bringing egg and sperm together, or adopting a child) is not an argument for denying them the right to clone. Or consider an example raised by Judge Richard Posner: a couple in which the husband has some unfortunate genetic defect.
Currently, if this couple wants a genetically related child, they have four not altogether pleasant options. They can reproduce naturally and resign themselves to the risk of passing on the disease to the child. They can go to a sperm bank and take a chance on unknown genes. They can bring egg and sperm together artificially and dispose of any affected baby before placing it in the mother, or before birth — though that might be objectionable, too.
Or they can get a male relative of the father to be a sperm donor, if such a relative exists. This is one case where even people bothered by creating a child under the lens of a microscope might see cloning as not the worst option. Even if human cloning offers no obvious benefits to mankind, why ban it? In a democracy we don't usually pass laws against something before there is actual or probable evidence of harm.
Before we go any further, it might make sense to require a temporary pause on research into human cloning in order to make a systematic enquiry into the grave questions it raises. When research into cloning is resumed, human cloning should remain a research activity for an extended period. And if it is ever attempted, it should — and no doubt will — take place only under careful examination and layers of legal administration.
Most important, human cloning should be governed by the same laws that now protect human rights. A world not safe for cloned humans would be a world not safe for the rest of us.
Words: 824
New Words
panic n. 恐慌,驚慌 v. (使)驚慌
preface n. 1.開(kāi)端,前奏,序幕 2.序言,前言,引言
refusal n. 拒絕
conservative a. 保守的,守舊的,傳統(tǒng)的 n. 保守的人,保守派
spiritual a. 1.宗教上的 2.心靈的,精神上的
constitute vt. 1.是,構(gòu)成 2.組成,構(gòu)成
gross a. 1.明顯錯(cuò)誤的 2.總的,總共的
applicable a. 適用的,合適的,適當(dāng)?shù)?br />
voluntary a. 自愿的,志愿的
consent n. 同意,準(zhǔn)許 vi. 同意,準(zhǔn)許
vivid a. 鮮艷的,鮮明的,生動(dòng)的,逼真的
reflection n. 1.考慮,深思 2.反射,反照;倒影 3.反映,表達(dá)
probable a. 很有可能的,大概的
◆improbable a. 不大可能的,未必確實(shí)的
sake n. 緣由,理由
surplus a. 過(guò)剩的,多余的 n. 過(guò)剩;剩余額
soccer n. 英式足球
horror n. 1.令人恐懼的事物,恐怖 2.恐懼,震驚
democratic a. 民主的,有民主精神的
sexual a. 性的,兩性的
■sperm n. 精子
queue vi. 排隊(duì) n. (排隊(duì)等候的)一隊(duì)人或車(chē)等
◆infertile a. 不育的;不結(jié)果實(shí)的
artificial a. 1.人造的,人工的 2.假的,矯揉造作的
defect n. 缺陷,缺點(diǎn)
reproduce v. 1.(指人類(lèi)、動(dòng)物等)繁殖,生殖 2.復(fù)制,再現(xiàn)
resign v. 1.順從,聽(tīng)從 2.辭職,引退
dispose v. 1.擺脫,處理,扔掉 2.安排,布置
lens n. 透鏡,(凹、凸)鏡片
microscope n. 顯微鏡
democracy n. 1.民主國(guó)家 2.民主;民主政體
temporary a. 短暫的,暫時(shí)的,臨時(shí)的
systematic a. 有系統(tǒng)的,有計(jì)劃的,有方法的
resume v. 再繼續(xù),恢復(fù)
layer n. 層
administration n. 1.管理,經(jīng)營(yíng),支配 2.行政部門(mén),行政機(jī)關(guān) 3.政府
govern v. 1.影響,支配,規(guī)定 2.統(tǒng)治,治理,管理
Phrases and Expressions
send into 使處于(某種狀態(tài)),使變得
at the prospect of/that… 當(dāng)意識(shí)到……可能時(shí)
grow out of 由... ...而生,起因于
make sense 有道理,合乎情理;明智
turn out (to be) 證實(shí)是,原來(lái)是
on/upon reflection 再考慮后
for the sake of sth./doing sth. 為了得到或擁有
view as 視為,看作
perceive as 視為,當(dāng)作
carry out 進(jìn)行,實(shí)施
in the name of 借... ...之名;為... ...目的
queue up 排長(zhǎng)隊(duì)
stock with 使藏有,使備有
stand a chance of 有可能(取得)
seek out 尋找并發(fā)現(xiàn)
resign oneself to sth. 只得接受
pass on 傳遞,傳給
take a chance on 冒險(xiǎn)
dispose of 擺脫,處理,扔掉
make an enquiry into 調(diào)查;打聽(tīng)
Proper Names
Nazi (德國(guó))國(guó)社黨黨員,納粹分子
Richard Posner 理查德·波斯納
誰(shuí)將得益于克隆技術(shù)?
上星期的新聞報(bào)道說(shuō),科學(xué)家已經(jīng)克隆了一只綿羊。這一消息引起了學(xué)術(shù)界和公眾的恐慌,他們預(yù)想下一個(gè)就輪到克隆人類(lèi)了。 這種反應(yīng)是可以理解的。 克隆向生物學(xué)最基本的規(guī)律發(fā)起了一次革命性的挑戰(zhàn),因此有理由擔(dān)心這或許是威脅人類(lèi)社會(huì)和人類(lèi)尊嚴(yán)的活動(dòng)的序曲。 然而,這種道義上的反對(duì)大多出自一種本能的、未經(jīng)思索的厭惡。 這種拒絕對(duì)此問(wèn)題作理性思考的行為,甚至使訓(xùn)練有素的科學(xué)家和其他專(zhuān)家也難以看清這件事的實(shí)質(zhì)。 雖然克隆人類(lèi)可能不會(huì)給人類(lèi)帶來(lái)很大的好處,但也沒(méi)有人能提供有力的例證證明它會(huì)帶來(lái)真正的危害。
保守派的宗教領(lǐng)袖宣稱(chēng),克隆人類(lèi)是對(duì)人類(lèi)尊嚴(yán)的一次重大挑戰(zhàn)。 假如克隆的人被當(dāng)作一種次等動(dòng)物,權(quán)利小,地位低,事實(shí)就會(huì)的確如此。 但是為什么會(huì)想到保護(hù)人類(lèi)權(quán)利和尊嚴(yán)的法律不適用于被克隆的人呢? 一名權(quán)威律師暗示說(shuō),克隆將會(huì)侵犯"基因惟一身份權(quán)"。 他從何處得來(lái)這一權(quán)利? 未經(jīng)通知并征得本人同意,成年人有權(quán)不被克隆,這是完全合理的。 但是,如果事先得到允許,那又會(huì)侵犯誰(shuí)的基因身份"權(quán)"呢?
有關(guān)克隆人類(lèi)前景的科幻小說(shuō)所發(fā)出的種種真切的警告,仔細(xì)想來(lái)卻變成了無(wú)稽之談。 例如,有人擔(dān)心父母克隆孩子是為了要有"備用器官",以備這個(gè)孩子器官移植之需。 但是,同卵雙胞胎的父母并不會(huì)把一個(gè)孩子看作另一個(gè)孩子的器官作坊。 為什么克隆孩子的父母應(yīng)該有所不同?
另一個(gè)引人不安的想法是,克隆會(huì)使人們致力于培育具有理想基因質(zhì)的個(gè)人(如數(shù)學(xué)天才、足球運(yùn)動(dòng)員等)。 這樣的想法很令人反感,不僅僅因?yàn)橐环N下意識(shí)的厭惡,而且還因?yàn)榧{粹分子以?xún)?yōu)化種族之名實(shí)施的恐怖行為。 但是,某些團(tuán)體實(shí)施的培育項(xiàng)目和在民主社會(huì)里已經(jīng)實(shí)施的更為無(wú)害的培育方式,二者之間存在著天壤之別:前者為迫切地培育某類(lèi)人而對(duì)其余的人進(jìn)行毀滅,而后者,比如說(shuō)律師,則是通過(guò)自由地選擇與別的律師發(fā)生性關(guān)系得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。 已經(jīng)有了貯存天才的冷凍精子的精子庫(kù),但它們還沒(méi)有生成一個(gè)優(yōu)等族,原因是很少有婦女排隊(duì)等候以這種方式懷孕。 為什么我們要認(rèn)為能夠克隆人時(shí)事情就該不一樣?
那么誰(shuí)可能從克隆技術(shù)中受益呢? 也許是瀕臨死亡的孩子的父母。 這在心理學(xué)上似乎不可信。 但是,和一個(gè)正常生育的孩子相比,被心存疑慮的父母所克隆的孩子,被關(guān)愛(ài)或被拋棄的機(jī)會(huì)卻是完全一樣的。 患不孕癥的夫婦也可能求助于克隆。 這樣的夫婦當(dāng)然也有其他選擇(人工授精,或收養(yǎng)孩子),但這不能作為剝奪他們克隆權(quán)利的借口。 或者不妨考慮一下理查德·波斯納法官舉出的例子:有一對(duì)夫婦,丈夫不幸有某種基因缺陷。 目前,如果這對(duì)夫婦想要一個(gè)具有自己遺傳基因的孩子,他們有四個(gè)不甚令人滿意的選擇。 他們可以自然生育,但卻要 冒著把疾病遺傳給孩子的風(fēng)險(xiǎn); 他們可以去精子庫(kù),嘗試不知名的基因; 他們也可以人工授精,然后在將受精卵植入母體之前,或在生育之前,放棄有遺傳缺陷的胎兒——盡管這也可能引起反對(duì); 或者,他們還可以請(qǐng)孩子父親的某位男性親戚捐獻(xiàn)精子——如果有這么一位親戚的話。 在這個(gè)例子中,就連不愿意在顯微鏡下創(chuàng)造孩子的人也可能認(rèn)為克隆不是最壞的選擇。
即使克隆人類(lèi)不會(huì)給人類(lèi)提供任何明顯的好處,可為什么要禁止它? 在民主社會(huì)里,除非有證據(jù)證明某件事確實(shí)或可能產(chǎn)生危害,否則我們通常不會(huì)立法禁止它。 在我們尚未繼續(xù)前進(jìn)之前,最好是先要求暫時(shí)停止克隆人類(lèi)的研究,以便系統(tǒng)地研究它所引發(fā)的深刻問(wèn)題。 當(dāng)克隆研究重新開(kāi)始時(shí),克隆人類(lèi)應(yīng)該仍然是一項(xiàng)歷時(shí)長(zhǎng)久的研究活動(dòng)。 而且,如果試圖研究,它就應(yīng)當(dāng)——而且毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)地將會(huì)——在細(xì)致的檢查和層層的法律監(jiān)督之下進(jìn)行。 最重要的是,約束人類(lèi)克隆行為的,應(yīng)當(dāng)是現(xiàn)在保護(hù)人權(quán)的同一法律。 對(duì)克隆人不安全的世界,也會(huì)是一個(gè)對(duì)我們其他人同樣不安全的世界。